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 1 Introduction1
Disin￿ ation is a long-standing issue in monetary economics.
On the empirical side, there is ample evidence that disin￿ ations yield short-run
output losses. Indisputably, the key indicator to gauge the real costs of disin￿ ation
has been the sacri￿ce ratio, calculated as the ratio between the cumulative percentage
output loss, i.e., the di⁄erence between actual and potential output, and the size of dis-
in￿ ation. Thus, the sacri￿ce ratio measures the real output cost per unit of permanent
decrease in in￿ ation. A wealth of empirical studies estimated the costs of disin￿ ation
for various countries, using di⁄erent econometric methodologies. In general, estimates
of these costs exhibit a great deal of variation across countries, episodes or time periods
and estimation methods. Gordon and King (1982) is an early assessment of the sacri￿ce
ratio for the U.S., based on the estimation of autoregressive Phillips curves (see more
recently, Andersen and Wascher, 1999). For EMU countries, Cuæado and Gracia (2003)
reports estimates of the sacri￿ce ratio between 0.55 and 1.96. Ball (1994b) analyses
speci￿c disin￿ ationary episodes in 19 moderate-in￿ ation OECD countries between 1960
and 1991, and comes up with estimates of sacri￿ce ratio between 1.8 and 3.3 (see also
Mankiw, 1999, and Zhang, 2005). Using the Vector Autoregression (VAR) methodology,
Cecchetti and Rich (2001) ￿nd estimates of the sacri￿ce ratio between 1 and 10 for the
U.S., while Durand et al. (2007) studies twelve EMU countries and reports substantially
lower sacri￿ce ratios, namely, between 0.23 to 0.75. In summary, among di⁄erent empir-
ical studies there seems to be little disagreement on the following facts: (i) a disin￿ ation
yields a loss in output; (ii) the value of the sacri￿ce ratio varies across countries and
time periods, but a plausible range is between 0.23 and 3.3.
1We would like to thank Jean Pascal BØnassy, Pierpaolo Benigno, Mark Gertler, Tommaso Monacelli
and seminar participants at the CDMA Workshop in St. Andrews, Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
Paris School of Economics, Piero Moncasca Workshop at the Einaudi Institute for Economics and
Finance, 2008 Computing in Economics and Finance conference, 49ma Riunione Annuale della Societ￿
Italiana degli Economisti. Ascari thanks the MIUR for ￿nancial support through the PRIN 05 and
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5On the theoretical side, however, there is a widespread view that the basic linearized
New Keynesian DSGE model, as in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), fails to replicate
a costly disin￿ ation. In a nutshell, being based on the Calvo (1983) price staggered
mechanism the basic New Keynesian DSGE model only delivers price stickiness but
not in￿ ation inertia. To the contrary, in￿ ation rate is described as a forward-looking
variable that can immediately adjust after a disin￿ ation, without any costly adjustment
of output. Ball (1994a) was among the ￿rsts to point out this inconsistency of standard
sticky price models, in which a disin￿ ation could also be followed by a boom rather
than a slump (see also Burstein, 2006). Indeed, in a subsequent paper, Ball (1995) calls
for imperfect credibility as a necessary device to explain the observed output costs of a
disin￿ ationary policy. More recently, Erceg and Levin (2003) and Goodfriend and King
(2005) introduce imperfect credibility in a standard New Keynesian model to explain the
famous Volcker disin￿ ation (see also Nicolae and Nolan (2006)). Also Mankiw (2001)
forcefully expresses the view that standard sticky price models cannot deliver in￿ ation
persistence and thus justify the costs of disin￿ ation. Indeed, this drawback was one of
the main reason that led Mankiw and Reis (2002) to propose a di⁄erent model of price
stickiness based on sticky information.
Nowadays, however, there is an operational model of business cycle ￿ uctuations,
based on the seminal work of Christiano et al. (2005) (CEE, henceforth). They show
that a medium-scale New Keynesian model, enlarged to accommodate various nominal
and real frictions, matched reasonably well the empirical ￿ uctuations along the business
cycle. Indeed, this model (or some slightly modi￿ed version of it) has been widely and
successfully employed both in empirical work (e.g., Smets and Wouters, 2003, Altig et
al., 2004, ) and in normative analysis (e.g., Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe, 2005).
However, it is surprising that no one has so far judged the ability of the CEE model to
account for the costs of disin￿ ation and more in general to address the issue of disin￿ ation
from a welfare perspective. This is what we do in this paper. We deliberately restrain
ourselves from changing any of the features of our reference model and the structural
parameters values as estimated or calibrated by CEE, and address two questions:
1. How successful is the current operational New Keynesian DSGE model of business
6cycle at replicating the empirically estimated costs of disin￿ ation and sacri￿ce
ratio, without resorting to any kind of imperfect credibility and/or information or
of irrationality in expectations?
2. How costly is a credible disin￿ ation in terms of welfare?
The answer to the ￿rst question is: quite a lot. Indeed, the simulation of the model
indicates that a credible disin￿ ation leads a prolonged decline of output and that the
value of the sacri￿ce ratio is well in line with the available empirical evidence.
With regards to the second question, we work out a rigorous welfare evaluation
of the costs of a disin￿ ation, constructing a welfare based sacri￿ce ratio. Interestingly,
despite the prolonged slump in output, we show that a disin￿ation implies small welfare
gains. The size of these welfare gains is very small: equal to a permanent increase in
initial steady state consumption of 0.06-0.07% each period per each point of diminished
in￿ ation. More precisely, given the CEE parameters, negligible long-run gains prevail
on even smaller short run costs. Indeed, surprisingly enough, the short run costs of a
disin￿ ation are negligible, despite the transitional economic downturn.
Finally, we want to raise a methodological consideration. Unlike the standard prac-
tice in the literature of approximating the model structural equations, here we simulate
numerically the original non-linear model. In our view, this is crucial because taking lin-
ear or log-linear approximations may rule out some important transmission mechanisms.
Yun (2005), for instance, emphasizes the role of relative price dispersion, often neglected
in linear models, in driving his results for optimal monetary policy. Also, money is non
superneutral in the CEE model. In this case, Ascari and Merkl (2007) shows that the
use of log-linear approximations to study a disin￿ ation can lead to misleading results,
since a disin￿ ation implies a movement from one steady state to another one.
2 An Operational Model of the Business Cycle
To study the e⁄ects of disin￿ ationary monetary policy we rely on the operational medium
scale New Keynesian DSGE model developed in CEE and then taken on, among others,
7in Smets and Wouters (2003) and Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2005, 2007). In this section
we discuss some key features of the model and leave to the Appendix a brief description
of the structural equations and parameters calibration.
The model features both real and nominal frictions, which are deemed to be crucial
to replicate the dynamic properties of the business cycle (see CEE for US or Smets and
Wouters, 2003, for the Euro Area). Real frictions include: monopolistic competition in
goods and labor markets, internal habit in consumption, variable capital utilization and
adjustment costs in investment decisions. As for nominal frictions: prices and wages are
sticky ￿ la Calvo with a clause of indexation. In particular, each period only a fraction
of prices and wages are set optimally; those prices and wages that cannot be reoptimized
are automatically adjusted to keep up with the in￿ ation rate occurred in previous period.
Finally, money balances enter the model in two ways: households derive direct utility
from holding real money balances (i.e., assumption of money-in-the-utility function) and
entrepreneurs must hold nominal money balances to pay wages before production (i.e.,
assumption of cash-in-advance).
We depart from our reference models with regards to monetary policy. We assume
the central bank sets the short-term nominal interest rate, i.e., it, according to the
non-linear rule de￿ned by
1 + it





, with ￿ > 1 (1)
where ￿t, ￿￿ and i￿ represent the in￿ ation rate, the in￿ ation target and the nominal
interest rate target, respectively. Notice, from the standard consumption Euler equa-
tion, it must hold that 1 + i￿ = (1 + ￿￿)=￿, where ￿ is the representative household￿ s
subjective discount factor.
Two distinct features of (1) are worth stressing. Firstly, our postulated nominal in-
terest rate targeting rule does not respond to the output gap. The reason for this choice
is the following. We think that a credible cold-turkey disin￿ ation and countercyclical
monetary policy behavior cannot coexist. Indeed, after implementing a permanent re-
duction of in￿ ation target, any attempt to soften the output decline at the expenses of
higher in￿ ation, may question monetary authority￿ s credibility to curb in￿ ation. Sec-
8ondly, our postulated nominal interest rate rule lacks an inertial term. Again, we think
that central bank￿ s attitude ought to be history independent. Especially at the time
the disin￿ ation is implemented, the short-term nominal interest rate has to be adjusted
freely in the light of new lower in￿ ation target.
Before analyzing the costs of disin￿ ation, it is important to highlight two things. The
￿rst consideration has to do with the deterministic steady state relationship between
output and in￿ ation. Although the degree of indexation in prices and wages is calibrated
equal to one, money is non-superneutral. This latter result is due to the cash-in-advance
constraint on intermediate ￿rms to pay wage bill. As illustrated in CEE, in this case the
real marginal cost schedule depends on the nominal interest rate. Albeit this hypothesis
is important to match the empirical impulse response functions and the overall short-run
dynamics, it also a⁄ects the deterministic steady state. Even with full price and wage
indexation, positive trend in￿ ation yields real output cost. Indeed, the higher the level
of trend in￿ ation, the larger the labor costs for the ￿rms; hence, ceteris paribus, the
lower the wage paid to workers. In response, households reduce their labor supply and
employment falls. Firms in turn decrease their capital stock, because labor and capital
are complements in the production function. Eventually, the level of output decreases.
The long-run Phillips Curve is not vertical.2 Given CEE calibration these e⁄ects are
rather minor: a permanent 1% reduction in in￿ ation implies roughly a 0.1% increase in
steady state output.3
The second consideration we want to draw attention to is methodological and con-
2From an empirical point of view, it has been di¢ cult to tackle this issue within the VAR literature
as the Blanchard and Quah (1989) restriction, i.e. no long-run e⁄ects of aggregate demand shock on
output, is typically used as an identifying restriction (see e.g., Cecchetti and Rich (2001)). However,
when this restriction is not imposed, it is not granted that output goes back exactly to its initial level
(see Collard et al. (2006) and FŁve et al. (2007)).
3It is important to stress that the assumption of full indexation in prices and wages rules out potential
real e⁄ects arising from nominal rigidities. It is well-known that a positive steady state in￿ ation rate
increases steady state price and wage dispersion in the absence of full indexation yielding an ine¢ ciency
loss on aggregate production (e.g., Ascari, 2004, Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe, 2005). In other words, with
partial wage and/or price indexation the real e⁄ects of long-run in￿ ation, and thus also the e⁄ects on
welfare, would be much larger.
9cerns the solution of the model. We have just seen that in the CEE model money is non
superneutral. This means that changes in trend in￿ ation have e⁄ects on the steady state
level of output. In our view, then, whenever a policy experiment leads to a transition
between two steady states one should restrain from using standard solution methods
based on local approximation. In these instances, it would be preferable and de￿nitely
more accurate to use non-linear solutions. And this is what we do in this paper. We sim-
ulate the perfect foresight transition path by numerically solving the non linear model
in DYNARE.4
3 The short-run e⁄ects of disin￿ ation
In this section we study the short-run e⁄ects of disin￿ ation in the non linear operational
New Keynesian DSGE model. However, before doing that, we de￿ne the notion of
disin￿ ation in the context of our theoretical model. Earlier to the disin￿ ation, the
economy is at a steady state characterized by a positive trend in￿ ation ￿, which is
pinned down by the in￿ ation target ￿￿
old, i.e., ￿ = ￿￿
old. At certain period, say t = 0,
the central bank reduces unexpectedly, instantaneously and credibly the in￿ ation target
from ￿￿
old to ￿￿
new implementing what is commonly known as a cold-turkey disin￿ ation.
Agents acknowledge the reduction of in￿ ation target is permanent and do not expect
any other policy surprise. E⁄ectively, our disin￿ ation experiment entails a transition
between two steady states in a perfect foresight non linear model.
As regards the new in￿ ation target we consider three cases, namely ￿￿
new = f0%;1%;2%g.
Cold-turkey disin￿ ations aimed at achieving an in￿ ation target of 1-2% are interesting
for at least two reasons. Such targets come near to the actual in￿ ation objectives at work
in many central banks, e.g., the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Bank of Canada,
the Bank of England and the European Central Bank.5 Furthermore, an in￿ ation target
of 2% is not far-o⁄ from the recent estimates of US Federal Reserve￿ s implicit in￿ ation
4For further details on DYNARE see the webpage: http://www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/dynare/.
5Both in New Zealand and Canada the numerical in￿ ation target extends from 1 to 3%. In the
United Kingdom the explicit in￿ ation objective is currently 2.5%, while in the Eurozone the European
Central Bank has an in￿ ation objective below, but close to, 2%.
10target.6 Instead, the reason for studying cold-turkey disin￿ ations aimed at achieving full
price stability, i.e., ￿￿
new = 0, is more theory-based as the recent literature on optimal
monetary policy has thoroughly stressed and emphasized the reasons why full price sta-
bility is socially desirable (see, e.g., Woodford, 2003). Finally, we present results both
for ￿ = 1:5 and ￿ = 3.
Figures 1 illustrates the dynamic adjustment of output, in￿ ation, nominal and real
interest rate after cold-turkey disin￿ ation aimed at achieving ￿￿
new = 2%, when ￿ = 1:5.
Each panel reports transition path starting o⁄ from di⁄erent initial values of trend
in￿ ation, namely, ￿￿
old = f3%;4%;5%g. In the non-linear CEE operational model, cold-
turkey disin￿ ations come with a sizable recession; the rate of in￿ ation is highly persistent
and gradually decreases towards the new target. Nominal and real interest rates increase
on impact and then slowly revert to steady state.
To understand the dynamic adjustment depicted in the ￿gure, consider for example
the disin￿ ation starting from ￿￿
old = 3%. When the central bank permanently reduces
the in￿ ation target only a fraction of intermediate ￿rms set optimal prices, because of the
Calvo staggered adjustment mechanism.7 Discounting the forthcoming decline of output,
necessary to bring down in￿ ation, optimizing ￿rms lower their prices. Remaining ￿rms
that instead are not allowed to optimize simply index their unchanged prices to previous
period￿ s in￿ ation rate. As a matter of fact, they increase their prices by 1 + ￿￿
old. As
shown in Figure 1, of these two con￿ icting pricing decisions the latter prevails. Aggregate
price index continues increasing but a slower pace. Thus, in￿ ation rate decelerates.
As in￿ ation does not immediately jump onto the new target, the central bank re-
sponds to the positive in￿ ation gap (￿1 ￿ ￿￿
new) with a monetary policy contraction. The
central bank temporarily increases the policy rate, despite disin￿ ation implies a lower
steady state nominal interest rate. The follow-on rise of real interest rate reduce the ag-
gregate demand: households postpone consumption and decrease investment spending.
6Leigh (2008) ￿nds that in the period 1990-2004 the US Federal Reserve￿ s implicit in￿ ation target
varied in the range 1-3%.
7Clearly, also for wage setters￿behavior the same reasoning follows through. Here, however, we
primarily comment on intermediate ￿rms￿behavior and in￿ ation dynamics.
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Figure 1: Cold-turkey disin￿ ations aimed at achieving ￿￿
new = 2% with ￿ = 1:5.
Furthermore, higher nominal interest rate increases intermediate ￿rms￿costs via the
cash-in-advance constraint. Real wage drops, households supply less labor and interme-
diate ￿rms reduce the rate of capital utilization. Taken as a whole, the level of output
falls. In successive periods, in￿ ation rate continues to adjust towards the new lower
target while the central bank starts cutting the nominal interest rate. Nonetheless, the
real interest rate remains above steady state for several quarters. The economy enters
a recession and the level of output achieves the bottom in the second quarter. At last,
the economy is successfully disin￿ ated in about 15 quarters.
Figure 1 further shows that neither the qualitative dynamic adjustment nor the
lapse of the recession and the time duration for in￿ ation to reach the new steady state
12are a⁄ected by the initial level of trend in￿ ation.8 What the level of ￿￿
old does a⁄ect,
however, is the amplitude of output ￿ uctuation during the transition. As shown in
the ￿rst column of Table 1, the percentage output drop (in deviation from the new
steady state level) at the trough substantially worsen as ￿￿
old increases. At the trough,
output drops by 0:25% for a disin￿ ation from 3 to 2%, whereas it drops by 0:71% for
a disin￿ ation from 5 to 2%. Intuitively, higher values of ￿￿
old make optimizing ￿rms
to cut prices more strongly, yielding to a larger drop of in￿ ation and a greater rise of
real interest rate. It is interesting to note that regardless of the new in￿ ation target,
either ￿￿
new =1% or ￿￿
new =0, the percentage output drops at the trough are of the same
magnitude for a given disin￿ ation size, i.e., ￿￿
old ￿ ￿￿
new.
Figure 2 illustrates the dynamic adjustment of output, in￿ ation, nominal and real
interest rate after cold-turkey disin￿ ations aimed at achieving ￿￿
new = 2%, when ￿ = 3.
The e⁄ects of having a more hawkish central bank are intuitive. In general, the monetary
policy is more restrictive (see the notable hike of nominal interest rate) and the output
downturn more severe (see the Table 1) . Nonetheless, adjusting ￿rms seems to behave
much like as in previous case (i.e., when ￿ = 1:5). As a matter of fact the adjustment
path of in￿ ation in the ￿rst ￿ve quarters after the disin￿ ation is surprisingly similar to
the top-right panel in ￿gure 1. Only afterwards, one can see small di⁄erences in terms
of adjustment speed. Indeed, with ￿ = 3 the cold-turkey disin￿ ation is accomplished in
about 12 quarters.
So, we have seen that cold-turkey disin￿ ations yield a notable recession but how
large are these short-run output costs? To answer this question we directly borrow from
the empirical literature on disin￿ ation (see e.g., Gordon and King, 1982) and de￿ne a













where Ynew represents the steady state level of output at ￿￿
new. Thus, our measure
indicates the cumulative percentage output loss the economy has to sacri￿ce to achieve
8We chose not to plot the dynamic adjustments for cold-turkey disin￿ ations aimed at ￿￿
new = 1%
and ￿￿
new = 0 as the transition is qualitatively very similar to ￿gure 1.







(% deviation from new steady state)
quarters


























EX-ANTE REAL INTEREST RATE
From 5% to 2%
From 4% to 2%
From 3% to 2%
Figure 2: Cold-turkey disin￿ ations aimed at achieving ￿￿
new = 2% with ￿ = 3.
a 1% permanent reduction of steady state in￿ ation. Two features of (2) are worthy to
notice. Firstly, we de￿ne the SR by calculating the output loss in deviation from the
new steady state. Secondly, we sum up the percentage output losses over the ￿rst T
periods. In particular, the value of T is chosen to re￿ ect the number of periods in￿ ation
takes to settle down to the new in￿ ation target.
Table 1 reports values of the model-consistent sacri￿ce ratios calculated both for
￿ = 1:5 (and T = 15) and ￿ = 3 (and T = 12). The ￿rst thing we want to stress here
is that the theoretical sacri￿ce ratios are positive and in line with the existing empirical
estimates (see the Introduction section). In particular, the sacri￿ce ratio turns out to be
approximately equal to 1:05 when ￿ = 1:5; whereas it takes up a slightly larger value,
14￿ = 1:5 ￿ = 3
￿￿
old ￿￿
new Output at trough SR (T=15) Output at trough SR (T=12)
3% 2% -0.24 1.04 -0.44 1.59
4% 2% -0.47 1.03 -0.88 1.60
5% 2% -0.71 1.02 -1.32 1.61
2% 1% -0.24 1.05 -0.45 1.61
3% 1% -0.48 1.04 -0.90 1.62
4% 1% -0.72 1.03 -1.34 1.63
1% 0 -0.24 1.06 -0.45 1.63
2% 0 -0.49 1.05 -0.91 1.64
3% 0 -0.73 1.05 -1.36 1.65
Table 1: Short-run costs of disin￿ ation. Output at the trough is expressed in percentage
deviation from the new steady state level.
i.e., 1:62, when the central bank is relatively more concerned with in￿ ation stabilization
around the target, i.e., when ￿ = 3. In fact, we have seen that in this latter case the
ensuing recession after the cold-turkey disin￿ ation is more severe. Notwithstanding,
the size of disin￿ ation does not seem to a⁄ect the sacri￿ce ratio. Varying the size of
disin￿ ation leads a roughly proportional rescaling of output transition paths and this
leaves practically unchanged the value of the sacri￿ce ratio.
In summary, in the medium-scale operational New Keynesian DSGE model a cold
turkey permanent reduction of trend in￿ ation entails sizable short-run output costs.
To bring down trend in￿ ation, say, from 4 to 2%, by means of a credible cold-turkey
disin￿ ation the economy would have to sacri￿ce a cumulative output loss of either 2.1 or
3.2% in relation to the type of interest rate rule. The in￿ ation adjustment would then
15be completed in about 2 or 3 years.
4 A welfare based measure of the cost of disin￿ ation
As already noted in Gordon and King (1982), the output loss from disin￿ ation does not
contain per se policy implications. A careful assessment must be made of the welfare
cost of lost output and the welfare bene￿ts of lower in￿ ation. On this latter point,
the recent monetary policy literature has largely emphasized the reasons why achieving
full price stability is desirable (see Woodford, 2003 and the references therein). One
notable advantage of working with microfounded structural model is that they provide
a natural welfare metric, namely the representative household￿ s value function. Hence,
we can calculate a welfare based indicator of the costs of disin￿ ations, rather than just
focussing on an empirical based one as the sacri￿ce ratio.
Mimicking the construction of the sacri￿ce ratio, a measure of the welfare loss caused
by disin￿ ation may be calculated as the di⁄erence between the value function at time
zero, i.e., V0 (when the disin￿ ation is actually implemented) and the value function at
the initial steady state in￿ ation, i.e., Vold (as if the disin￿ ation was not implemented).









Notice that V0 represents the discounted sum of future stream of instantaneous utility, as
such it measures both the transition dynamics and the long-run e⁄ects of the disin￿ ation.
Paralleling the standard sacri￿ce ratio de￿nition, WSR> 0, if V0￿Vold < 0. That is,
the welfare-based sacri￿ce ratio is positive if the disin￿ ation reduces welfare .
The consumption equivalent measure
A policy maker is interested in the welfare cost of implementing a disin￿ ationary
policy, but given that the utility function is not cardinal, a measure based on the value
function is not very revealing. The di⁄erence ( V0-Vold ) can be converted in consumption
equivalent units. The consumption equivalent measure de￿nes the constant fraction of
consumption that households should give away in each period in the starting steady
16state, that equates the value function households would obtain if the disin￿ ation is
implemented. Note that this is a true measure of the costs of disin￿ ation in terms
of consumption: indeed, it measures how much households have to su⁄er in terms of
consumption loss, in order to reduce the in￿ ation rate permanently of a certain amount.
The derivation of the welfare based measure in terms of consumption equivalent
units is straightforward. The initial value function, in case the central bank does not
disin￿ ate the economy and keeps in￿ ation target permanently at ￿￿


















where cold, hold and mh
old denote respectively consumption, hours worked and real money
balances held households; ￿0 and ￿m are structural parameters.9 Provided we have the
value of V0, and this is actually available from the numerical solution of the model, we



















Thus, the consumption equivalent measure is given by
￿ = 1 ￿ exp[(1 ￿ ￿)(V0 ￿ Vold)]. (6)








The ￿rst column of Table 2 reports the values of SRW. The main result can be stated
as:
Result 1. Our proposed welfare based sacri￿ce ratio calculated in a medium scale New
Keynesian DSGE model for di⁄erent disin￿ ation experiments assumes negative
9See the Appendix for further details.
10Note that there is no minus in front of this ratio, to maintain a positive sign for a loss. Indeed, if
V0-Vold < 0, that is, disin￿ ation brings about a welfare loss, then ￿ > 0; and vice versa.
17values. This means that disin￿ ation is welfare improving.11
Therefore, when discussing about the e⁄ects of disin￿ ation policies it would be more
appropriate to use the notion of welfare gain ratio, rather than sacri￿ce ratio as in
the empirical literature. We think this is a novel and interesting result: the empirical
literature on disin￿ ation focuses only on the short-run costs in terms of output (or
unemployment), but neglects any long-run gain. We show, to the contrary, that in a
medium scale DSGE monetary model of the business cycle a disin￿ ationary policy is
welfare improving.
Moreover, note that the welfare gain from disin￿ ating: (i) decreases with the size
of the disin￿ ation; (ii) decreases with the starting level of in￿ ation, for a given size of
disin￿ ation.
A second notable result from Table 2 is:
Result 2. The size of SRW, however, is small: the welfare gain is equivalent to an extra
0.06% of consumption each period.
Actually, the results are possibly even more striking, if we disentangle the short-run
welfare costs of a disin￿ ation during the transition dynamics and the long-run welfare
gains stemming from higher price stability. Indeed, in the standard medium scale DSGE
macro model, despite a disin￿ ation entails a large and prolonged recession, such that
the implied sacri￿ce ratio is in line with the empirical evidence, the short-run welfare
costs of such a painful adjustment path are plainly insigni￿cant.
To show that, following the same line of reasoning above, we de￿ne:
(i) the long-run costs in terms of consumption equivalent units:
￿1 = 1 ￿ exp[(1 ￿ ￿)(Vnew ￿ Vold)] (8)
11Note that this qualitative result does not depend on the inclusion of real money balances in the
utility function. We can also calculate a similar measure without taking into account the gain in utility
coming from an increase in real money balances in the new steady state. The measure would then be



















Short-run Welfare costs (￿10
-2
)
￿ = 1:5 ￿ = 3 ￿ = 1:5 ￿ = 3
3% 2% -6.46 -6.38 -7.23 0.77 0.85
4% 2% -6.39 -6.32 -7.18 0.79 0.86
5% 2% -6.35 -6.27 -7.13 0.79 0.86
2% 1% -6.55 -6.48 -7.34 0.78 0.86
3% 1% -6.49 -6.41 -7.29 0.80 0.87
4% 1% -6.44 -6.36 -7.24 0.80 0.87
1% 0 -6.67 -6.59 -7.46 0.80 0.87
2% 0 -6.59 -6.52 -7.40 0.81 0.89
3% 0 -6.54 -6.46 -7.35 0.81 0.89
Table 2: Welfare-based sacri￿ce ratios.
where Vnew and Vold denote the values function in the new and old in￿ ation steady
states. The above indicator can be expressed per unit of diminished in￿ ation to yield a



















Table 2 reports the long-run welfare gains and the short-run welfare costs in con-
sumption equivalent units for various disin￿ ation experiments. The order of magnitude
12Note that we use a coherent de￿nition as above also for the long-run SR: Indeed, if Vnew-Vold < 0
(that is if disin￿ ation brings about a welfare loss) then ￿ > 0; and vice versa.
19of the short-run welfare costs is, roughly about 0.008-0.009% of initial consumption.
Therefore, the long-run gains quantitatively dominate, though being themselves very
small (roughly 0.07%). The main message from Table 2 is that a disin￿ ation is going
to be welfare improving of the order of an increase of initial consumption of 0.06-0.07%
each period per point of diminished in￿ ation. That is, the welfare e⁄ects of a disin￿ ation
are barely relevant, despite high short-run costs in terms of output losses.
This stands in sharp contrast with the consensus view about the e⁄ects of a credible
disin￿ ation. What is the intuition for these results? To illustrate this point, let us con-
sider the case with ￿ = 3. Figure 3 displays the path of consumption and employment,
expressed in deviation from the new steady state, together with value of the utility func-
tion. The disin￿ ation induces a prolonged recession that cause both consumption and
employment to be below their new (and higher) steady state value for some periods.
Consumption and employment, however, has opposite e⁄ects on the utility function of
the representative agent. It follows, therefore, that the net e⁄ects of the recession on the
utility of the representative agent is ambiguous. Indeed, the decrease in consumption
dominates in the impact period, dragging the utility function down. Already from the
second period, however, the e⁄ects of the dynamics of employment takes over, and the
utility function is above its new higher long-run value. Moreover, it will stay there for
all the periods of the recession. This is because the drop in employment is bigger in
percentage terms, and slightly more sluggish. It follows that the positive e⁄ect of em-
ployment is quite e⁄ective in counterbalancing the negative e⁄ect of lower consumption.
Overall the transition, thus, entails a short-run cost, as shown above, but of a negligible
order of magnitude. Finally, also the value of the utility function without counting the
real money balances term is visualized in Figure 3, so to make clear that the role of the
real money balances term in the utility function in the above results is nil.
This result obviously hinges on the representative agent assumption, that is, on com-
plete markets and risk-sharing. That is, the welfare analysis based on a representative
agent framework can not take into account, for example, the fact that some people
may su⁄er a very big drop in utility during recessions because they lose their jobs and
do not have access to ￿nancial markets. Such heterogeneity and composition e⁄ect is
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Figure 3: Cold-turkey disin￿ ations aimed at achieving ￿￿
new = 2% with ￿ = 3.
missing by construction. However, we believe our results have two notable interpreta-
tions. First, if taken as face value, they simply show that disin￿ ations, in particular,
and recessions, in general, could be less of a problem than we normally think, if the
economy could provide an e¢ cient risk-sharing amongst agents (either through capital
markets, or some public welfare system). In this sense, this is once again the Lucas￿
negligible costs of business cycle result. Second, if one, instead, is skeptical about the
actual relevance of the welfare results, then, at the very least, these results cast serious
shadows on using these DSGE models for welfare evaluation without ￿inspecting the
mechanism￿ . In particular, the whole literature on optimal policy problems or on the
ranking between di⁄erent monetary policy rules is bound to be based on mechanism
21similar to the ours.
5 Conclusions
Disin￿ ation is an important topic in monetary economics and the subject of a large
literature. However, there is a widespread consensus that the New Keynesian models
can not explain the cost of disin￿ ation observed in the data, for which they need to
resort to lack of credibility or information.
The logic of the policy experiments laid out in this paper is clear and straight. We
want to test whether the workhorse DSGE model of the US business cycle, i.e., the CEE
model, can account for the sacri￿ce ratio and for the dynamic paths of the variables
after a disin￿ ation, that is a permanent shock in the in￿ ation rate. We think this is a
sort of needed requirement for an operational monetary model.
Our results show that a perfectly credible cold-turkey disin￿ ation entails a sizable
and long-lasting recession in the CEE model. In addition, the values of the sacri￿ce
ratio are in line with those estimated in the empirical literature.
Moreover we conduct a rigorous welfare evaluation of the costs of disin￿ ation, propos-
ing a welfare based sacri￿ce ratio. Surprisingly enough, despite a deep and prolonged
recession the short-run costs of a disin￿ ation are negligible in terms of consumption
equivalent units. A disin￿ ation would actually imply very tiny welfare gain, since in
the CEE model money is not superneutral (despite full indexation), and there are very
small long-run welfare gain than overcome the short-run costs.
The fact that the CEE model can replicate the main facts after a disin￿ ation is at
odds with the consensus in the literature, and may be good news for the New Keynesian
models. This however does not mean that some of the model features or mechanisms
should not be improved to tackle the disin￿ ation question. Indeed, we think that the
testing the CEE model with respect to disin￿ ation had proved to be very useful to
suggest the most important aspects for current and future research.
First, the indexation is a reduced form assumption that can act as a substitute
for many other more structural phenomenon. There is a macroeconomic reduced form
22equivalence of di⁄erent microeconomic models, so that actually a similar e⁄ect can come
out from irrational price setters (rule of thumbers), inattentive price setters or lack of
credibility, and hence sluggish expectation adjustment.
Secondly, a Calvo time dependent price setting model would need indexation in order
not have unpalatable long-run implications of a permanent change in in￿ ation because
of tne large e⁄ects of price dispersion in this model. Moreover, despite the fact that
we look only at moderate rate of in￿ ation, for which the Calvo parameter de￿ning the
frequency of price adjustment can be considered constant, ideally one would like to work
with a model where the changes in the average in￿ ation level induce ￿rms to revise their
behavior. In other words, a time dependent model is particularly fragile to the Lucas
critique when used to analyzed changes in the average in￿ ation rate. Last, but not
least, recently Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) shows that the many price adjustments
occur on the intensive margin rather than on the extensive margin. Embedding what
Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) calls a second generation model of state dependent pricing
in the CEE framework would cure all these problems at once: no need for indexation to
cure the unpalatable long-run e⁄ects, shelter from the Lucas critique, and the intensive
margin. Moreover, as we know from Burnstein (2006) this could generate interesting
non-linearities regarding the e⁄ects of large vs. small disin￿ ations.
Finally, our welfare results are rather surprising. The abandonment of the risk shar-
ing assumption, together with a proper account of heterogeneity among agents regarding
the impact of a recession on their welfare, may overturn our results.
Fortunately, the current research and the recent contributions to the New Keynesian
literature are taking up all these challenges.
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26A The Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005)
Model
In this Appendix we describe the CEE model, following closely the outline in Schmitt-
Grhoe and Uribe (2005).
Households
There is a continuum of in￿nitely-lived households whose expected intertemporal
















where E0 de￿nes the mathematical expectation operator conditional on the information






is well-behaved and increasing in consumption ct and money holdings mh
t, while decreas-
ing in hours worked hs
t. Preferences display habit in consumption levels, measured by
the parameter b:
There is a continuum of ￿nal goods indexed by i 2 [0;1], that are aggregated in the











where the parameter ￿ indicates the elasticity of substitution between di⁄erent varieties














There is a continuum of labour services hjt, j 2 [0;1], that are combined according













where ~ ￿ is the elasticity of substitutions of labour types. The standard cost mini-







t; where Wjt is the wage paid to labor type j and Wt is a wage in-







. The total labor supply is found by integrating

















Agents owns physical capital kt that depreciates at rate ￿. The capital accumulation
equation is








where the function S introduce the adjustment cost on investment and satis￿es the
properties that S (1) = S0 (1) = 0; S00 (1) > 0: The model features also variable capacity
utilization of physical capital, denoted by ut;. The cost of capital then depends on the
degree of utilization and it is given by a(ut). Agents rent capital to ￿rms at a real
interest rate rk
t and decide also over the utilization rate. There are complete markets
for state contingent assets, such that all agents choose the same level of consumption.




























































it+1 = ￿t (19)
















Wages are sticky a la Calvo, and 1￿ ~ ￿ is the probability of being able to reset wages
next period. If wages can not be re-optimized, the CEE model assumes that wage are
anyway updated according to past in￿ ation, such that: wj;t+1 = wj;t￿
~ ￿
t where ~ ￿ is the
degree of indexation to past in￿ ation. De￿ne ~ wt as the optimal wage set every period
t. The union chooses the optimal wage maximizing its the utility function given by

















































All the reset optimal wages are identical in all labour markets.
Firms
Each good is produced by a ￿rm which monopolistically supply its own variety using
a production technology of the form
ztF (kit;hit) ￿  ;
where zt is an aggregate technology factor common across ￿rms, and   represents a
￿xed cost of production. The production function F (kit;hit) is well-behaved and it￿ s
the same across ￿rms. Final goods can be used for consumption, investment, public









yt = ct + it + gt + a(ut)kt: (24)
Firms rent capital from the households on a competitive market, and must pay a




it = ￿wthit (25)
The ￿rms￿problem is then to maximize the expected value of future pro￿ts, under their
demand function (23) and the cash-in-advance constraint (25). The ￿rst order conditions
with respect to capital and labour services are
mcitztFkit (kit;hit) = r
k
t (26)







29Since F is homogeneous of degree one, equation (26) and equation (27) imply that all
￿rms have the same marginal costs and aggregation across ￿rms is straightforward.
Prices are sticky a la Calvo. Every period each ￿rm can choose a new price of
its own good with a probability 1 ￿ ￿. As for wages, also the prices that can not be
resetted optimally, are automatically updated according to past in￿ ation, such that:
Pit = Pit￿1￿
￿
t￿1; where ￿ is the degree of price indexation. The ￿rst order condition for



































Again, all the reset optimal prices are identical for all goods.
The Government
Government expenditure is ￿nanced through lump-sum taxes and seigniorage




where mt denotes real money balances, and ￿t ￿ Pt=Pt￿1 is the (gross) in￿ ation rate at
time t: Government minimizes the costs of acquiring the composite good, hence given






To close the model we postulate the monetary policy uses the simple non-linear
nominal interest rate rule as described in the paper.
Equilibrium
The model equilibrium conditions are
















































is the price dispersion generated by price staggering, causing a
wedge between aggregate supply and aggregate absorption. Similarly wage staggering








Functional forms and calibration


















































Calibration is also as in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2005), that follows CEE￿ s estimation
results. The parameters values are listed in the Table 3.
31Parameter Value Description
￿ 1:03￿0:25 Time discount rate
￿ 0:36 Share of capital
  0:5827 Fixed cost (guarantee zero pro￿ts in steady state)
￿ 0:025 Depreciation of capital
￿ 1 Fraction of wage bill subject to CIA constraint
￿ 6 Elasticity of substitution of di⁄erent varieties of goods
~ ￿ 21 Elasticity of substitution of labour services
￿ 0:6 Probability of not setting a new price each period
~ ￿ 0:64 Probability of not setting a new wage each period
b 0:65 Degree of habit persistence
￿0 1:1196 Preference parameter
￿1 0:5393 Preference parameter
￿m 10:62 Intertemporal elasticity of money
￿ 2:48 Investment adjustment cost parameter
￿ 1 Price indexation
~ ￿ 1 Wage indexation
￿1 0:0324 Capital utilization cost function parameter
￿2 0:000324 Capital utilization cost function parameter
z 1 Steady state value of technology shock
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